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The Challenge of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Shipping: Assessing the International Maritime 
Organization’s Regulatory Response 
 
Yubing Shi 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As a comparatively cost effective, clean, and safe method of transportation, international 
shipping offers an important means of moving goods internationally and enables other 
activities such as leisure cruising.1 Many factors contribute to the development of 
international shipping. As an example, the evolution of ship propulsion has progressed from 
sailing ships to steam ships powered by coal and then to an almost universal use of diesel 
engines, significantly accelerating international trade.2 Similarly, advances in 
telecommunication and information and communications technology infrastructure, 
reductions in trade barriers, and low energy costs have also contributed to the expansion of 
international shipping and seaborne trade.3 However, the increase in fuel consumption 
associated with increasing seaborne trade has led to a rise in atmospheric emissions from 
international shipping.  
 Emissions from international shipping, in particular greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
have contributed to climate change. The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 
fourth assessment report states that ‘most of the observed increase in global average 
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
                                                 
The author would like to thank Robin Warner and Warwick Gullett for their valuable 
comments on earlier drafts. However, the author takes full responsibility for the 
content of the article. 
1 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Introduction to IMO 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx>; see also Rajiv Saxena, Overseas 
Shipping Made Cheaper 42(7) Industrial Engineer 24 (2010). But see Matthew 
Stibbe, Shipping Security: All at Sea? 3(2) Infosecurity Today 32 (2006). Stibbe 
asserts that marine terrorism makes the shipping costly. 
2 Sujith Kollamthodi et al, Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping: Trends, Projections 
and Abatement Potential: Final Report, at 3 (2008).  
3 Ibid.  
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anthropogenic GHG concentrations.’4 Global warming serves as the main manifestation of 
climate change. It is axiomatic that GHG emissions are one of the main contributions to 
global climate change.  
 Currently, seven types of GHGs are listed in the Kyoto Protocol to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), namely carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC), sulphur hexafluoride, and 
nitrogen trifluoride.5 The GHG emissions from international shipping mainly constitute 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and HFC.6 Their total amount has been increasing 
too rapidly in recent years to be ignored. The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) 
second study on GHGs in 2009 states that in 2007 carbon dioxide emissions from 
international shipping reached 870 million tonnes, which covers 2.7 percent of the global 
emissions of carbon dioxide.7 Furthermore, mid-range emission scenarios indicate that by 
2050, if no aggressive emission-reduction strategies are introduced,8 carbon dioxide 
emissions from international shipping may grow by a factor of two to three (compared with 
the emissions in 2007) due to the growth in shipping.9 These statistics and scenarios show 
that the increasing trend of GHG emissions from international shipping will be maintained in 
the long term and should be recognized as a growing problem among scientists, industry, and 
environmental policy makers.  
                                                 
4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth Assessment Report, Synthesis 
Report, 36 (2007), 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html>.  
5 Kyoto Protocol, 37 ILM 32 (1998), Annex A. UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 31 ILM 849 (1992) [UNFCCC]. The 1998 Kyoto Protocol only lists six types 
of GHGs, but a seventh type of GHG, nitrogen trifluoride, was added to the category 
in the Doha Climate Change Conference in 2012. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol, Decision 1/CMP.8, C.N.718.2012.TREATIES-XXVII.7.c (8 December 
2012) (not yet in force).  
6 O Buhaug et al, Second IMO GHG Study 2009, Executive summary, 3 (2009).  
7 Ibid. These data have been criticized since they do not take account of the global economic 
downturn since 2009. To provide a better foundation for IMO’s future work, an 
update of the 2009 IMO study of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions estimate from 
international shipping is currently being carried out, and the final report is expected to 
be submitted to the IMO in 2014. Report of the Expert Workshop on the Update of 
GHG Emissions Estimate for International Shipping (Update-EW), note by the 
Secretariat, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 65/5/2 (4 March 2013).  
8 Ibid; N Nakicenovic et al, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (2000). The scenarios are 
primarily based on assumptions of global development in the International Panel on 
Climate Change’s (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios storylines.  
9 Buhaug et al, supra note 6 at 1.  
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 The problem of GHG emissions from international shipping is an issue of 
international dimension. To unite the international community in addressing this issue jointly, 
the United Nations has made active institutional and legal responses. The UNFCCC and its 
Kyoto Protocol, together with its Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA), the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), 
Conference of the Parties (COP), and the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), have contributed to the international attempts to 
address the issue, although the effectiveness of their efforts has been questioned.10 As a 
consequence, GHG emissions from international shipping are not regulated by the UNFCCC 
and its Kyoto Protocol.11  
 As a specialized agency of the United Nations, the IMO has recognized the problem 
of GHG emissions from ships and has acted on it based on Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol 
as well as on the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO Convention) 
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).12 In contrast to the 
efforts made within the UN international climate change regime, there are high expectations 
of the IMO due to its mandate and strength in regulating GHG emission-related technical 
matters. In particular, the newly adopted revised Annex VI of the International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention)13 and the guidelines 
                                                 
10 See, eg, Sebastian Oberthür, Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol 3(3) 
Climate Policy 191, 193 (2003). Oberthür asserts that parties to the UNFCCC had 
wide discussions on the GHG emissions from international transport, and its SBSTA 
has been working on marine bunker fuels. However, under the UNFCCC process, no 
regulation on shipping GHGs has been achieved. However, see, Bernd Hackmann, 
Analysis of the Governance Architecture to Regulate GHG emissions from 
International Shipping 12(1) Int’l Envt’l Agreements: Politics, Law & Economics 85, 
90 (2012). Hackmann claims that the work by the UNFCCC on the issue is still 
proceeding, and regulating shipping GHG emissions should fall under the scope of the 
Bali Action Plan.  
11 The UNFCCC only requires the regulation of national reduction of GHG emissions from 
ships, while the Kyoto Protocol requires the IMO to regulate GHG emissions from 
international shipping. UNFCCC, supra note 5, Article 4(1)(c); Kyoto Protocol, supra 
note 5, Article 2(2).  
12 A detailed discussion on this issue is provided in the next section. Convention on the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, opened for signature 6 March 
1948, 289 UNTS 3, amended and renamed as Convention on the International 
Maritime Organization, 9 UTS 61 [IMO Convention]. 
13 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 12 ILM 1319, as 
amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS 3, 17 ILM 546 
[MARPOL Convention]. To date, the MARPOL Convention has adopted six annexes 
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produced by the IMO have assured the international community of progress regarding the 
adoption of energy-efficiency measures. Since these outcomes have been achieved since July 
2011, there has not been much scholarly analysis on these rules as yet. Current discussions 
mainly focus on the institutional interaction14 between the IMO, the UNFCCC, and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as the proposed market-based 
measures (MBMs) in relation to the reduction of GHG emissions from ships.15 This article 
conducts a comprehensive analysis of the IMO’s efforts in regulating these issues.  
 The first part of this article looks briefly at the IMO’s mandate for regulating shipping 
GHG emissions. Having established the central role of the IMO in providing a solution to the 
problem, the article then examines and assesses the IMO GHG regime from three 
perspectives, namely the evolution of the regime, Annex VI and its amendments to the 
MARPOL Convention, and the main outcomes achieved within the IMO.  
 
II. IMO’S MANDATE TO REGULATE GHG EMISSIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AND THE 
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and their revisions, namely, Annex I on Oil (entered into force 2 October 1983); 
Annex II on Noxious Liquid Substances Carried in Bulk (entered into force 6 April 
1987); Annex III on Harmful Substances Carried in Packaged Form (entered into 
force 1 July 1992); Annex IV on Sewage (entered into force 27 September 2003); 
Annex V on Garbage (entered into force 31 December 1988); and Annex VI on Air 
Pollution from Ships (entered into force 19 May 2005).   
14 See, eg, Lindsey Wuisan, Judith Van Leeuwen, and CSA Van Koppen, Greening 
International Shipping through Private Governance: A Case Study of the Clean 
Shipping Project 36(1) Marine Policy 165 (2012); Hackmann, supra note 10; 
Sebastian Oberthür, The Climate Change Regime: Interactions with ICAO, IMO, and 
the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement, in Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds), 
Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance, 53 (2006); Oberthür, 
supra note 10.  
15 See, eg, Harilaos N Psaraftis, Market-based Measures for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Ships: A Review 11(2) WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 211 (2012); Henrik 
Ringbom, Global Problem--Regional Solution? International Law Reflections on an 
EU CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme for Ships 26(4) Int’l J Marine & Coastal L 613 
(2011); Md Saiful Karim and Shawkat Alam, Climate Change and Reduction of 
Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from Ships: An Appraisal 1(1) Asian J Int’l L 131 
(2011); Jodie Moffat, Arranging Deckchairs on the Titanic: Climate Change, 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and International Shipping 24(2) Australian & New 
Zealand Maritime LJ 104 (2010).  
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To cope with the increasingly serious issues of safety at sea and marine pollution,16 the 
United Nations Maritime Conference was held in Geneva on 6 March 1948. This conference 
adopted a convention that formally established the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization (IMCO), which subsequently changed name to the IMO in May 
1982.17 Article 1 of the IMO Convention outlines five purposes of the organization, which 
can be broadly summarized into its jurisdiction on technical and commercial matters such as 
discriminatory practices by shipping companies. Due to the possible threat to the practice of 
free enterprise in the shipping industry from the commercial jurisdiction of the IMO, many 
states have attempted to limit the purposes of the IMO to technical aspects rather than 
commercial regulation. Consequently, the IMO has focused primarily on its technical 
jurisdiction.18 Therefore, the main purpose of the IMO is ‘to encourage the general adoption 
of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of 
navigation and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.’19  
 The IMO’s structure has developed, reflecting its evolving mandate.20 Initially, the 
IMO only comprised the Assembly, the Council, and the Maritime Safety Committee 
(MSC).21 Currently, the IMO consists of an Assembly, a Council, and five main Committees: 
the MSC, the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), the Legal Committee, the 
Technical Co-operation Committee, and the Facilitation Committee. Among these, the 
MEPC, which comprises all member states, is responsible for the reduction of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. In addition, the inter-sessional meeting of the IMO’s 
Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships (GHG-WG) was established between two 
MEPC sessions. These changes indicate the growing significance of marine environmental 
protection and co-operation among various institutions.22  
                                                 
16 GP Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement, at 79–80 
(1999).  
17 IMO Convention, supra note 12. 
18 To date, the IMO has never been allowed to exercise its full economic mandate. Alan 
Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution: The Law and Politics of International 
Regulation, at 75 (2006); see also Pamborides, supra note 16 at 83.  
19 IMO Convention, supra note 12, Article 1(a).  
20 Tan, supra note 18 at 76.  
21 Lawrence Juda, IMCO and the Regulation of Ocean Pollution from Ships 26(3) Int’l & 
Comparative LQ 558, 559 (1977).  
22 For instance, the establishment of the Facilitation Committee is to harmonize shipping 
procedures and eliminate unnecessary formalities and ‘red tape’ in international 
shipping. Tan, supra note 18 at 76.  
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 Currently, there are two views concerning the IMO’s mandate in regulating GHG 
emissions from international shipping. One view is that the IMO’s mandate comes from the 
Kyoto Protocol.23 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol requests the Annex I states of the 
UNFCCC to ‘work through the IMO’ to limit or reduce their shipping GHG emissions. 
Additionally, the acceptance of this mandate by the IMO also complies with the IMO 
Convention.24 However, this authorization was given to the IMO only after the UNFCCC 
failed to reach consensus on the allocation of such emissions among different states.25 In 
other words, at that time, the IMO was generally regarded as the most competent 
international organization to regulate this issue. The other view attributes the IMO’s mandate 
on this issue to the IMO Convention and UNCLOS on the grounds that Articles 1(a) and 59 
of the IMO Convention and Articles 211 and 212 of the UNCLOS provide the IMO with such 
competence.26 However, both views have their legal bases, and it is open to debate which 
rules should prevail if there is a conflict between the Kyoto Protocol, the IMO Convention, 
and the UNCLOS on the issue. In this case, it might be appropriate to strike a compromise 
between both views. Or to be more specific, the IMO Convention and the UNCLOS provide 
the IMO with general competence to regulate this type of issue, while the Kyoto Protocol 
provides the IMO with a specific mandate in regulating this matter.  
                                                 
23 See, eg, Haifeng Wang, GHG Emissions from the International Goods Movement by Ships 
and the Adaptation Funding Distribution, in Zongwei Luo (ed), Green Finance and 
Sustainability: Environmentally-Aware Business Models and Technologies, 274 at 
275 (2011). 
24 IMO Convention, supra note 12, Article 68.  
25 Since 1995, when the first Conference to the Parties (COP-1) to the UNFCCC was held, 
the SBSTA within the UNFCCC has been working on the possible inclusion of GHG 
emissions from international shipping into the Kyoto Protocol. In 1996, the SBSTA 
selected five options from eight choices as the basis for discussing the possible 
allocation of emissions among different states but failed in reaching consensus. Due 
to the highly technical and international character of the shipping industry, the 
UNFCCC finally decided to turn the issue to the IMO. Article 2(2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol formally excludes the regulation of GHG emissions from international 
shipping from the Kyoto Protocol, while emissions from domestic shipping are still 
included in national targets for Annex I states. See Possible Revisions to the 
Guidelines for the Preparation of National Communications by Parties Included in 
Annex I to the Convention, SBSTA 4th Session, Doc UNFCCC/SBSTA/1996/9/Add.1 
(24 October 1996) 11; Karim and Alam, supra note 15 at 134; Oberthür, supra note 
10 at 193. 
26 This opinion has been held by the Sub-Division for Legal Affairs within the IMO. See also, 
eg, Karim and Alam, supra note 15 at 147–48; Oberthür, supra note 10 at 195.  
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 Seen in this way, the two views are not conflicting. This approach is underpinned by 
the newly adopted revised Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention. The preamble of Annex 
VI provides: 
 
Recognizing also that adoption of the amendments to Annex VI in no way prejudges the negotiations 
held in other international fora, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), nor affect the positions of the countries that participate in such negotiation.27 
 
This expression appears to represent the IMO’s view on this issue. That is, regarding the 
decisions on GHG emissions from ships, those made by the IMO, including the revised 
Annex VI, are independent from those reached within the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol regime. 
Nevertheless, as an obligation under the Kyoto Protocol, the IMO needs to report its progress 
on this issue to the UNFCCC on a regular basis.28 Based on the earlier approach, it might be 
deduced that theoretically both the common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) 
principle (from the UNFCCC) and the no more favourable treatment (NMFT) principle (from 
the IMO) should be applied to the issue under discussion. To better understand this view, a 
general background on the two principles is provided.  
 The CBDR principle requires both developed and developing states to contribute to 
addressing environmental problems and imposes the primary responsibility on developed 
states due to their different historical contributions to the problems and the differentiated 
capability of developed and developing states. It can be traced back to the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment, when the concept of sustainable development was 
first raised and the different development priorities of developed countries and developing 
countries were identified.29 Thus, the Stockholm conference represented ‘the first time that an 
international consensus had been reached, at least in theory, on applying CBDR and 
differentiated standards to international environmental problems.’30 This principle was 
                                                 
27 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI, preamble [emphasis added].  
28 Within the IMO, the MEPC reports any progress relating to GHG emissions from 
international shipping to the Council of the IMO, while the IMO provides regular 
progress reports to the SBSTA within the UNFCCC.  
29 See, eg, Nina E Bafundo, Compliance with the Ozone Treaty: Weak States and the 
Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility 21(3) Am U Intl L Rev 461 at 
468 (2006).  
30 Michael  Weisslitz, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility: Differential versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution 
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implicit in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer to the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer31 and first explicitly formulated in 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.32 To date, it has been 
widely accepted and endorsed by many conventions and treaties, including the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),33 the 1992 UNFCCC, and its Kyoto Protocol.34 
 The NMFT principle refers to ‘port States enforcing applicable standards in a uniform 
manner to all ships in their ports, regardless of flag.’35 Article 3 of the IMO Convention treats 
the ‘normal processes of international shipping business’ as a prior way for the IMO to deal 
with shipping related matters, which indeed provides a legal basis for the NMFT principle. 
The term NMFT was included in the MARPOL Convention and applies to all of the annexes 
of the convention.36 So far, this policy has been consistent without exception among all fifty-
three IMO treaty instruments currently in existence. 
 Given that the CBDR principle runs through the Kyoto Protocol,37 it could be 
construed that the authorization of the IMO’s mandate from the Kyoto Protocol indicates that 
the CBDR principle should also apply to the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. 
Nevertheless, in practice, developed countries generally insist on the application of the 
NMFT principle to this issue, while developing countries back the CBDR principle.38 It 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the Global Climate Change Context 13(2) Colorado J Int’l Envt’l Law & Policy 
473 at 480 (2002).  
31 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 ILM 1550, Article 5. 
This protocol requires both developed countries and developing countries to work 
together to reduce controlled substances but provides developing countries with a ten-
year grace period. This practice is consistent with the principle of common but 
differentiated responisbility (CBDR), but the term of the CBDR was not put forward 
with explicit explanation. Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
1513 UNTS 323 [Vienna Convention]. 
32 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 (1992), Principle 7 [Rio 
Declaration].  
33 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 ILM 818 (1992), Article 20(4) [CBD].  
34 UNFCCC, supra note 5, Article 3–4; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, Article 10.  
35 Buhaug et al, supra note 6 at 20.  
36 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Article 5(4) stipulates that, ‘[w]ith respect to the ship 
of non-PArticleies to the Convention, PArticleies shall apply the requirements of the 
present Convention as may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment 
is given to such ships’ [emphasis added].  
37 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, Article 10.  
38 See, eg, the United States, Spain, and Sweden underscore the application of the no more 
favourable treatment (NMFT) principle to this issue, whereas China, India, Brazil, 
Saudi Arabia, and Peru support the application of the CBDR principle. Report of the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th 
Session, Agenda Item 22, Doc MEPC 60/22 (12 April 2010), Annex 4.  
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seems this conflict can be resolved if both the principles apply to the issue, and this approach 
has been accepted by UNFCCC Secretariat39 as well as by some states and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).40 Is it feasible for the IMO to apply both the CBDR principle and the 
NMFT principle when it utilizes its competence to address the GHG emissions from ships? 
Probably, the key lies in the appropriate interpretation of ‘differentiated responsibility’ under 
the CBDR principle. Current international environmental agreements indicate that the 
differentiated responsibility consists of three categories, namely differentiated central 
obligations, differentiated implementation arrangements, and the granting of assistance 
including financial and technological assistance.41 To reach acceptable methods of applying 
the CBDR principle in reducing shipping GHG emissions by both developed and developing 
countries is quite possible, provided the interests of the various stakeholders are taken into 
consideration and well balanced. Although the CBDR principle was not fully incorporated in 
the energy efficiency measures recently adopted by the IMO, some of the proposed MBMs 
do apply the CBDR principle. Further discussion of these issues is contained in the following 
sections.  
 
III. THE IMO GHG EMISSIONS REGIME 
 
The IMO has partially regulated GHG emissions from international shipping by means of 
various negotiations and discussions within its MEPC. The conventions, codes, resolutions, 
and various discussions achieved or conducted during this process constitute the IMO regime 
on the reduction of shipping GHG emissions or, in other words, the IMO GHG emissions 
regime. This part of the article first reviews the development of this regime and then 
examines Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention and its amendments—the major 
                                                 
39 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 
61st Session, Agenda Item 24, Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010), Annex 6, 2. At the 
sixty-first MEPC meeting, the UNFCCC Secretariat made a statement, which asserts 
that ‘[w]e have to commit ourselves to work on a solution which respects both 
principles, and allows each treaty regime to retain the integrity of its principles and 
practices.’  
40 See, eg, Malaysia and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) support the application of 
the two principles to the issue. Report of the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 22, Doc MEPC 
60/22 (12 April 2010), Annex 4, 10; Ensuring No Net Incidence on Developing 
Countries from a Global Maritime Market-Based Mechanism, submitted by WWF, 
IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/6 (22 December 2011).  
41 Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, at 191 
(2006).  
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achievement of this regime to date. Finally, the outcomes within the MEPC are summarized 
and analysed. 
 
1. Evolution of the IMO GHG Emissions Regime 
 
Although discussions on GHG emissions from ships within the IMO started in the late 1980s, 
it is generally accepted that the IMO’s work on this issue formally commenced in 1997.42 
During that year, the MARPOL Conference not only adopted a protocol on Annex VI to the 
MARPOL Convention but also adopted Resolution 8 on ‘carbon dioxide emissions from 
ships,’ which requested the IMO to undertake a study on GHG emissions from ships and 
consider feasible carbon dioxide reduction strategies.43 Following joint efforts by several 
internationally renowned research institutes, a study of GHG emissions from ships was 
published in 2000.44 This study not only answered the question of why GHG emissions from 
shipping should be reduced, but it also explored how to deal with the issue. It canvassed the 
reduction potential of different technical, operational, and market-based approaches, which to 
some extent provide a ‘road map’ for future policies within the IMO. In 2003, a resolution 
was adopted by the IMO Assembly on ‘IMO policies and practices related to the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions from ships,’ urging the MEPC to ‘identify and develop the 
mechanism or mechanisms needed to achieve the limitation or reduction of GHG emissions 
from international shipping.’45 Since then, the MEPC has been working on this issue by 
means of various negotiations and discussions within its series of session meetings as well as 
in its GHG-WGs.  
 The evolution of the IMO GHG emissions regime has been lengthy and intermittent. 
During a fourteen-year period from September 1997 to July 2011, no binding agreements 
regarding GHG emissions from international shipping were reached within the IMO, and 
                                                 
42 IMO, Main Events in IMO's Work on Limitation and Reduction of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from International Shipping (2011), 
<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emission
s.aspx> 3.  
43 Ibid.  
44 These institutes were from Norway and the United States, namely MARINTEK (Norway), 
Det Norske Veritas (Norway), ECON, Center for Economic Analysis (Norway), and 
Carnegie Mellon University (United States). Kjell Skjølsvik et al, Study of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, at 7 (2000).  
45 Resolution A.963(23) on IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, IMO Assembly 23rd Session, Agenda Item 19 
(5 December 2003).  
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producers of emissions were exempt from liabilities under this regime. On 15 July 2011, 
shipping GHG emissions were partially regulated by technical and operational measures. 
Intensive discussions on this issue have only occurred since 2008. During this process, the 
IMO reiterated at least three times its role as the most competent international body in 
regulating GHG emissions from shipping. This claim might have resulted from competitive 
institutional pressure from other international organizations such as the UNFCCC and the 
possibility of unilateral measures being adopted by individual states and the European Union 
(EU).46 It has been generally accepted that the measures tackling shipping GHG emissions 
can be classified into technical measures, operational measures, and MBMs. Concerning the 
technical and operational measures, the IMO is the only competent international body 
governing the issue. The IMO has been mandated to regulate technical matters on shipping, 
and currently no other international body possesses the IMO’s technical expertise. In practice, 
the global shipping industry,47 including national shipping industries from the UNFCCC’s 
non-Annex I states,48 takes the view that the IMO is the only competent organization to 
regulate the issue from a technical and operational perspective. Against this backdrop, 
technical and operational measures have been regulated by the IMO in the form of energy 
efficiency measures under the revised Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention in July 2011. 
However, this may not be the case in the future regulation of MBMs. Since some MBM 
options involve out-of-sector emission reductions and international trade that are beyond the 
competence of the IMO, it is possible that a working group between the IMO and the 
                                                 
46 See Oberthür, supra note 10 at 202–3.  
47 For instance, the four Round Table members, namely the International Chamber of 
Shipping (ICS), the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the 
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) and the 
International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), asserted that 
both technical and operational measures and market-based measures (MBMs) should 
be governed by the IMO. Future IMO Regulation Regarding Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from International Shipping, submitted by Denmark, Marshall Islands, 
BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, and OCIMF, MEPC 57th Session, 
Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 57/4/2 (21 December 2008) at para 10; Round Table of 
International Shipping Associations, Round Table Associations Position Paper on 
GHG+MBMs (22 February 2012), 
<https://www.bimco.org/About/Press/Press_Releases/2012/2012_02_22_Round_Tabl
e_MBM.aspx>.  
48 For instance, China’s shipping industry generally supports the IMO’s role in regulating 
technical and operational measures to tackle shipping GHG emissions. Wang Erde, 
‘Consensus Achieved by Reduction Negotiations and China Is to Start Its Reduction 
in 2019,’ Twenty-First Century Business Herald (Beijing), 6 July 2011, 
<http://stock.sohu.com/20110726/n314586469.shtml>.  
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UNFCCC or the World Trade Organization (WTO) could be established to collaborate in 
addressing this issue. In fact, some UNFCCC non-Annex I states such as China, India, and 
Malaysia doubt the competence of the IMO in regulating MBMs and assert that MBMs 
should be determined by the UNFCCC.49  
 The debate on the incorporation of either the CBDR principle or the NMFT principle 
into the reduction of GHG emissions from ships has run through all of the negotiations and 
discussions within the IMO. The conflict of the two principles has delayed the advancement 
of the negotiations within the MEPC.50 To expedite the negotiation process within the MEPC, 
the fifty-second MEPC meeting adopted a two-step strategy, according to which the MEPC 
was to deal with all of the technical matters related to GHG limitations or reductions first and 
then resolve the politically related issues including the application of the CBDR or NMFT 
principles.51 However, it has been difficult to separate the two steps. In 2008, the fifty-
seventh MEPC meeting adopted nine fundamental principles as a basis for future regulations, 
although they were opposed by many developing countries. Principle 2 provides that the 
future IMO framework should be ‘binding and equally applicable to all flag States in order to 
avoid evasion,’52 which incorporates the NMFT principle. The fifty-eighth MEPC meeting in 
2008 discussed a proposed change to Principle 2, which was amended to read that it was, 
‘binding and equally applicable to all ships, without this requiring States to accept similar 
regulations/standards in other fora.’53 In this case, the responsible entity shifts from flag 
states to all ships and the application of this principle is limited to either the MEPC or the 
IMO. However, the NMFT principle remained in this version, and, consequently, no 
consensus was achieved. As to the proposed MBMs, the application of the CBDR or the 
NMFT principle has been the main focus of debate, which can be seen from the succeeding 
rounds of negotiations. It is concluded that the evolution of the IMO GHG emissions regime 
is a process where various technical and operational measures and MBMs have been 
                                                 
49 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 
60th Session, Agenda Item 22, Doc MEPC 60/22 (12 April 2010), Annex 4, 2, 8, 10.  
50 See Hackmann, supra note 10 at 96.  
51 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Second Session, 
MEPC 52nd Session, Agenda Item 24, Doc MEPC 52/24 (18 October 2004) at para 
4.35.  
52 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, 
MEPC 57th Session, Agenda Item 21, Doc MEPC 57/21 (7 April 2008) at para 4.73.  
53 Identifying Consensus on IMO Principles on Addressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Shipping, submitted by Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, 
Marshall Islands, Norway, Panama, and the United States, MEPC 58th Session, 
Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 58/4/16 (1 August 2008) at para 5.  
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discussed and negotiated in an attempt to reach agreement between developed and developing 
countries. To date, this regime is still under development; however, some outcomes, 
including the newly amended Annex VI and some guidelines, have been achieved within the 
MEPC.54 
 
2. Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention and Its Amendments 
 
As a means of reducing shipping GHG emissions, technical and operational measures were 
raised and examined in the report entitled Study of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships in 
2000 (the first IMO GHG study). Based on both a short-term and long-term perspectives, the 
report classifies carbon dioxide reduction potential by technical measures into two categories: 
measures for new ships and measures for existing ships.55 It identifies various technical and 
operational measures and concludes that these measures have a limited potential for reducing 
shipping emissions, and it might be ‘more feasible’ for the shipping industry to implement 
these measures primarily through new ship construction.56 The second IMO GHG study in 
2009 emphasizes the role of new ship construction in increasing efficiency and reducing 
emissions and proposes a mandatory energy efficiency design index (EEDI) for new ships as 
an incentive to improve the design efficiency of these ships.57 Based on this work and on 
intensive discussions and negotiations on various technical, operational, and market-based 
measures within the IMO, the sixty-second MEPC meeting adopted the revised Annex VI to 
the MARPOL Convention on 15 July 2011. This amendment represents ‘the first ever 
mandatory global [and legally binding] GHG reduction regime for an international industry 
sector.’58 Since that time, GHG emissions from shipping have been partially regulated. 
However, this amendment to Annex VI only regulates a package of mandatory technical and 
operational measures to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping. By adding a new 
Chapter 4 to Annex VI on the regulation on energy efficiency for ships, the amendment 
                                                 
54 These outcomes include the amended MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI, 
adopted on 15 July 2011, and four guidelines, adopted in 2 March 2012. See note 75 
in this article.  
55 Kjell Skjølsvik et al, supra note 44 at 14.   
56 Ibid at 8–9.  
57 Buhaug et al, supra note 6 at 1. The report concludes that if technical and operational 
measures are implemented together, ‘these measures could increase efficiency and 
reduce the emissions rate by 25% to 75% below the current levels.’  
58 IMO, Mandatory Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping Adopted at IMO 
Environment Meeting, <http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/42-
mepc-ghg.aspx>.  
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makes mandatory the EEDI for new ships and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan 
(SEEMP) for all ships.  
 Due to the deadlock in the negotiations of the CBDR and NMFT principles within the 
IMO, a breakthrough on other measures including MBMs has not yet been achieved. The 
successful outcome on the technical and operational regulation can be attributed to the 
following two factors. First, the energy efficiency measures were included in the revised 
Annex VI rather than creating a new Annex VII to the MARPOL Convention. For this 
amendment to Annex VI, the ‘tacit acceptance’ procedure applied. According to this 
procedure, amendments of the MARPOL Convention annexes or appendices to such annexes 
enter into force on a specified date unless a specific number of state parties object by an 
agreed date.59 Due to the technical nature of these annexes and appendices, it might be 
inferred that the ‘tacit acceptance’ procedure basically applies to technical amendments. In 
this case, the ‘silence’ of a member state represents its approval and makes a formal 
acceptance unnecessary.60 This procedure, however, does not apply to either the articles of 
the convention or to the introduction of a new annex.61 The main benefit of the ‘tacit 
acceptance’ procedure lies in the expedited entry into force of the amendments. This 
procedure partially explains why these revisions entered into force on 1 January 2013 shortly 
after their adoption, despite the opposition of many developing countries.62 Second, the 
voting mechanism within the MEPC accelerates the adoption of these measures. Rule 27 of 
the Rules of Procedures of the MEPC provides that decisions of the committee and of its 
subsidiary bodies are made by a majority of the members present and voting rather than by a 
consensus.63 This policy ensures that a resolution can be adopted by the MEPC even if some 
countries with large owned fleets oppose it. To change this situation, many developing 
countries proposed at the sixty-fourth MEPC meeting that all decisions of the MEPC on GHG 
                                                 
59 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Article 16.  
60 Pamborides, supra note 16 at 101.  
61 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Article 16(2)(f), 16(5).  
62 See, eg, Comments on the Proposed Mandatory Energy Efficiency Regulations, submitted 
by China, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, Doc MEPC 62/5/10 (5 May 2011). The co-
sponsors of this proposal, namely China, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa,  opposed 
the adoption of the amendment because of its exclusion of the CBDR principle, 
technical uncertainty, and other factors. They also opposed the inclusion of energy 
efficiency measures in MARPOL Annex VI due to the different nature of GHGs and 
other air pollutants. 
63 IMO, Basic Documents, volume 1, at 113 (2010).  
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emissions from ships should be adopted by consensus, but the debate on this issue has been 
postponed until the sixty-fifth MEPC meeting in 2013.64  
 The energy efficiency measures apply to all ships of 400 gross tonnage and above.65 
Due to the global financial crisis since 2009, this new regulation has imposed a great deal of 
pressure on global shipping industries, in particular, those from developing countries. 
Nevertheless, under Regulation 19, there is flexibility in the application of the EEDI: 
 
Regulation 19 
1. This chapter shall apply to all ships of 400 gross tonnage and above … 
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this regulation, the Administration may waive the 
requirement for a ship of 400 gross tonnage and above from complying with regulation 20 and 
regulation 21. 
5. The provision of paragraph 4 of this regulation shall not apply to ships of 400 gross tonnage and 
above: 
1. for which the building contract is placed on or after 1 January 2017; or 
2. in the absence of a building contract, the keel of which is laid or which is at a similar stage of 
construction on or after 1 July 2017; or 
3. the delivery of which is on or after 1 July 2019; or 
4. in cases of a major conversion of a new or existing ship, as defined in regulation 2.24, on or 
after 1 January 2017, and in which regulation 5.4.2 and regulation 5.4.3 of chapter 2 apply. 
[emphasis added] 
 
Regulation 19.4 and 19.5 indicate that for some countries the actual commencement date of 
the EEDI might be postponed six and a half years from 1 January 2013.66 Since the 
administration is generally the flag state of a ship,67 this regulation gives the ships from 
developing countries a long lead time for their preparation and adjustment. This treatment is 
still non-differentiated between developed and developing countries and thus does not apply 
                                                 
64 Further Work on GHG Emissions from Ships, submitted by Brazil, China, India, Peru, 
Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 
64/5/9 (27 July 2012) at para 8.1.  
65 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 19.1. 
66 Or such ships will be exempt of complying with EEDI until 1 January 2017 based on 
contract date. MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 
19.5.2.  
67 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Article 2(5).  
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the CBDR principle.68 In practice, this waiver might be used primarily by ships flying the 
flags of developing countries due to the much more stringent requirements by developed 
countries. Nevertheless, prior to the adoption of this amendment, Vanuatu submitted a 
proposal on possible exemptions from the EEDI requirements for ships trading to the least 
developed countries and small island developing states, but it was not accepted by the sixty-
first MEPC meeting.69  
 In this sense, this waiver clause could be deemed to be a compromise between 
developed countries and developing countries. According to an assessment by Lloyd’s 
Register and Det Norske Veritas, the impact of the waiver clause (Regulation 19.5) is 
estimated to be low on the total emission reduction potential.70 This is because low 
compliance costs and the commercial disadvantages associated with non-compliance make it 
unattractive for flag states or shipowners to opt for an EEDI waiver.71 Given the situations of 
the countries supporting this waiver clause, notably Brazil, China, and Saudi Arabia, the most 
likely level of waiver is only 5 percent.72 To assist with the implementation of the mandatory 
                                                 
68 This regulation was misinterpreted by some media and scholars as solely applying to the 
developing countries. See, eg, John Vidal, Maritime Countries Agree First Ever 
Shipping Emissions Regulation 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/18/maritime-countries-shipping-
emissions-regulation>; Laura Boone, Reducing Air Pollution from Marine Vessels to 
Mitigate Arctic Warming: Is it Time to Target Black Carbon? 1Carbon & Climate 
Law Rev 13, 18 (2012). Vidal commented that ‘China, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and South 
Africa have secured a six and a half year delay for new ships registered in developing 
countries.’  
69 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 
61st Session, Agenda Item 24, Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) at ss 5.32–5.33. 
Before the meeting, Vanuatu proposed to include a provision in the draft regulation on 
an exemption for these vessels trading to least developed countries and small island 
developing states (SIDS). However, the committee did not agree with the proposal on 
the grounds that the adoption of this provision could mean that ‘the least efficient 
ships would serve these trades/routes indefinitely’ and would prejudice the benefits of 
developing countries due to higher transportation costs resulted as such.  
70 Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures 
for International Shipping, Doc MEPC 63/INF.2, Annex (31 October 2011) at 6–7, 
Appendix 1, 3.  
71 Ibid, Appendix 1, 1–3. Appendix 1 of the report analyses that technology cost of 
compliance to EEDI will be low due to such factors as EEDI reference lines, ship 
hydrodynamic optimization, and preparation for future more stringent Phases 2 and 3; 
and an EEDI non-compliance ship is projected to suffer from certain commercial 
costs including higher ship fuel cost, cost of re-verification, second hand value, 
opportunity costs, and charter-ability.   
72 Ibid. According to the report, these three countries supported the waiver clause at the sixty-
second MEPC meeting. If the waiver will be taken up by these countries, as of 
17 
 
regulations on energy efficiency for ships in the 2011 Annex VI, the sixty-third MEPC 
meeting in March 2012 adopted four important guidelines.73 These guidelines, together with 
various technical, operational, and MBMs, are discussed in the next section. 
 
3. Outcomes within the MEPC 
 
Measures dealing with shipping GHG emissions generally can be classified into three 
categories: technical measures, operational measures, and MBMs. These measures have been 
widely discussed and negotiated within the MEPC since the adoption of Resolution 8 on 
‘carbon dioxide emissions from ships’ in 1997. Currently, technical and operational measures 
are included in Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention in the forms of the EEDI and the 
SEEMP requirements respectively, whereas MBMs are still unregulated. This section 
introduces the newly adopted technical and operational measures, followed by an assessment 
on their benefits and deficiencies. It then provideds an analysis and assessment of potential 
MBMs.  
 
A. Technical Measures 
 
The EEDI is the main technical measure regulated by the revised Annex VI to the MARPOL 
Convention in 2011. The EEDI provides a specific figure representing a minimum energy 
efficiency level for certain ship types and size segments, expressed in grams of carbon 
dioxide per ship’s capacity-nautical mile (for example, gross tonne nautical miles). The lower 
EEDI indicates better energy efficiency of ship design. Regulations 20 and 21 divide it into 
                                                                                                                                                        
October 2011, the current tonnage and number of ships for these three flags totally 
cover 4.6 percent of the global fleet. 
73 These four guidelines are: Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of the Attained Energy 
Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for New Ships, Resolution MEPC.212(63), Doc 
MEPC 63/23 (2 March 2012), Annex 8 [EEDI Calculation Guidelines]; Guidelines for 
the Development of A Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), 
Resolution MEPC.213(63), Doc MEPC 63/23 (2 March 2012), Annex 9 [SEEMP 
Guidelines]; Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the Energy Efficiency Design 
Index (EEDI), Resolution MEPC.214(63), Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 (2 March 2012), 
Annex 10 [EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines]; Guidelines for Calculation of 
Reference Lines for Use with the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), Resolution 
MEPC.215(63), Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 (2 March 2012), Annex 11 [EEDI 
Reference Lines Guidelines].  
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attained EEDI and required EEDI,74 and both of them are calculated by a formula based on 
the technical design parameters for a given ship.75 Based on the formula, the attained EEDI 
should be less than or equal to the required EEDI.76 As a ‘non-prescriptive’ and 
‘performance-based’ mechanism, the EEDI only requires a minimum energy-efficiency 
level.77 Provided the EEDI requirement is achieved, ship designers and shipbuilders are free 
to choose the most cost-efficient solutions for the ship to meet the regulations. The EEDI 
could provide a strong incentive for the shipping industry to improve ship fuel consumption 
with updated technical developments. Meanwhile, the EEDI is basically a ‘hard rule’ rather 
than a commercial incentive scheme. Based on the mandatory EEDI requirements, 
substandard ships might be detained, fined by port states, or even forbidden to trade, although 
the way to achieve the emissions reduction is left to the shipping industry.78  
 Aside from the EEDI waiver clause under Regulation 19 of Annex VI, the EEDI does 
not apply to all ship types or to all types of propulsion systems. Regulation 21 (required 
EEDI) only lists seven types of ships, namely bulk carriers, gas carriers, tankers, container 
ships, general cargo ships, refrigerated cargo ships, and combination carriers.79 Ships with 
diesel-electric propulsion, turbine propulsion, and hybrid propulsion are currently excluded 
from the EEDI requirement.80 The exemptions for these types of ships can be mainly 
attributed to the technical difficulty of incorporating them into the current EEDI formulae due 
to the complexity of the shipping emissions. Nevertheless, as the first step in reducing the 
majority of shipping emissions sources, the current EEDI coverage has embraced 70 percent 
of emissions from new ships.81 The regulated seven types of ships are essentially those 
designed to transport cargos, representing ‘the largest and most energy intensive segments of 
                                                 
74 Attained EEDI refers to the EEDI value achieved by an individual ship in accordance with 
Regulation 20 of chapter 4, MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI; while 
required EEDI is the maximum value of attained EEDI that is allowed by Regulation 
21 of chapter 4 for the specific ship type and size. MARPOL Convention, supra note 
13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 2.36–37.  
75 The formula of required EEDI is indicated by Regulation 21 of MARPOL Annex VI, while 
the formula of attained EEDI is provided by its guidelines. Guidelines on the Method 
of Calculation of the Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for New Ships, 
Resolution MEPC.212(63), Doc MEPC 63/23 (2 March 2012), Annex 8, Article 2.  
76 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 21.1.3.  
77 IMO, supra note 42 at 12.  
78 Wang Erde, ‘Consensus Achieved by Reduction Negotiations and China Is to Start Its 
Reduction in 2019,’ Twenty-First Century Business Herald (Beijing), 26 July 2011. 
[in Chinese].  
79 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 21, Table 1, 2.  
80 Ibid, Regulation 19.3.  
81 IMO, supra note 42, Annex 1, 32.  
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the world merchant fleet.’82 The MEPC is currently working on the development of EEDI 
frameworks for ships not covered by the current EEDI, such as roll-on–roll-off (ro-ro) cargo 
ships, ro-ro passenger ships, passenger ships, as well as ships with non-conventional 
propulsion systems.83 This step-by-step approach was utilized by the IMO to relieve strong 
opposition from developing countries and expedite the regulation progress within the MEPC. 
However, the amendment was not reached by consensus within the MEPC, which indicates a 
challenge on future implementation.84 As a global mandatory instrument, the amended Annex 
VI requests port states to verify if there is a valid International Energy Efficiency Certificate 
on ships calling at their ports so as to monitor the compliance of ships.85 Nevertheless, some 
flag states may not join the instrument, and the ships flying their flags may seek suitable 
routes to avoid the regulation. To facilitate the enforcement of EEDI requirements, the 
amendment and subsequent guidelines have provided a phased approach, and an IMO 
commissioned report offers technological options. 
 First, Regulation 21 provides four phases for the implementation of the EEDI. Phase 0 
(1 January 2013–31 December 2014) provides a two-year grace period for all ships regardless 
of their flags to be exempt from EEDI requirements. This regulation gives the shipping 
industry lead time to do necessary preparations such as technology research and development 
and staff training. This measure was initially proposed by China as a five-year Phase 0 and 
was supported by other developing countries.86 Thus, it is actually a compromise achieved 
between developed countries and developing countries. In Phase 1 (1 January 2015–31 
December 2019), a carbon dioxide reduction level of 10 percent is mandated, and this 
percentage will become higher every five years to be in line with updated technological 
developments in efficiency and reduction measures. In Phase 3 (1 January 2025 onwards), a 
30 percent reduction is set for most ship types calculated from a reference line for ships built 
                                                 
82 Ibid at 12.  
83 Ships with non-conventional propulsion systems refer to ships with diesel-electric 
propulsion, turbine propulsion, and hybrid propulsion.  
84 Md Saiful Karim, IMO Mndatory Eergy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping: 
The First Mantory Global Greenhouse Gas Reduction Instrument for an International 
Industry 7(1) Macquarie J Int’l & Comp Envt’l L 111, 113 (2011).  
85 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 10.5.  
86 Report of the Outcomes of the Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Energy 
Efficiency Measures for Ships, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/3 
(7 July 2010) at para 2.19.2. In Doc EE-WG 1/2, China argued that the reduction rate 
X should not be implemented immediately once the mandatory EEDI takes effect and 
that is X=0 for the first phase for five years.  
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between 2000 and 2010.87 This schedule for implementation follows a step-by-step approach 
and provides differentiated requirements for different ship sizes. Generally, the EEDI 
requirements on ship size below certain capacities are lower. This arrangement meets the 
special demand by various states for trade considerations, physical port limitations, and cargo 
logistic issues since not all states need large-size ships. Although, according to the economics 
theory of ‘economies of scale,’ at a given speed, the larger the ship the lower the fuel 
consumption per unit of cargo.88  
 Second, to meet the EEDI requirements for new ships, the selection of technologies is 
vital for ship designers and shipbuilders. An assessment report commissioned by the IMO 
provides fifteen types of technologies for reducing future ship’s EEDI as shown in Table 1.89 
These technologies can be classified into five groups, namely: 
 
• ship capacity enhancement; 
• hull and propeller;  
• engines, waste heat recovery, and propulsion system;  
• alternative fuels; and  
• alternative sources of energy.90  
 
Table 1. Technologies for EEDI Reduction 
No. EEDI Reduction Measures Remark 
1 Optimized hull dimensions and form Ship design for efficiency via choice of main dimensions 
(port and canal restrictions) and hull forms 
2 Lightweight construction New lightweight ship construction material 
3 Hull coating Use of advanced hull coatings/paints 
4 Hull air lubrication system Air cavity via injection of air under/around the hull to reduce 
wet surface and thereby ship resistance 
5 Optimization of propeller-hull Propeller-hull-rudder design optimization plus relevant 
                                                 
87 A reference line refers to ‘a curve representing an average index value fitted on a set of 
individual index values for a defined group of ships,’ so it represents the average 
efficiency for ships. The reference line was also called baseline but was later 
abandoned by the MEPC as the reference line can better reflect its purpose and 
function. EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines, supra note 73, Article 4; IMO, 
supra note 42 at 12.  
88 IMO, supra note 42 at 34.  
89 Ibid at 14–15. EEDI Calculation Guidelines, supra note 73. 
90 Ibid.  
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interface and flow devices changes to ship’s aft body 
6 Contra-rotating propeller Two propellers in series; rotating at different direction 
7 Engine efficiency improvement De-rating, long-stroke, electronic injection, variable 
geometry turbocharging, and so on 
8 Waster heat recovery Main and auxiliary engines’ exhaust gas waste heat recovery 
and conversion to electric power 
9 Gas fuelled  Natural gas fuel and dual fuel engines 
10 Hybrid electric power and 
propulsion concepts 
For some ships, the use of electric or hybrid would be more 
efficient 
11 Reducing on-board power demand 
(auxiliary system and hotel loads) 
Maximum heat recovery and minimizing required electrical 
loads flexible power solutions and power management 
12 Variable speed drive for pumps, 
fans, and so on 
Use of variable speed electric motors for control of rotating 
flow machinery leads to significant reduction in their energy 
use 
13 Wind power (sail, wind engine, and 
so on) 
Sails, flettner rotor, kites, and so on, which are considered to 
be emerging technologies  
14 Solar power Solar photovoltaic cells  
15 Design speed reduction (new builds) Reducing design speed via choice of lower power or derated 
engines  
Source: Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for 
International Shipping, Doc MEPC 63/INF.2 (31 October 2011), Annex at 14–15.  
 
Compared with the seven types of technologies available for new ships as indicated in the 
first IMO GHG study, there are currently more choices available for the shipping industry.91 
It is projected that during Phases 0 and 1 (1 January 2013–31 December 2019), hull, 
propeller, and main engine optimization will contribute more to EEDI compliance, while 
during Phases 2 and 3 (1 January 2020 onwards), new technologies and design speed 
reduction will be utilized more to meet the EEDI requirements.92 The order of these 
technologies does not imply any prioritization. However, it is of ‘critical importance’ to 
ensure safe navigation under adverse conditions, while energy efficiency of international 
shipping is promoted.93 Based on this understanding, the need for a minimum speed is 
                                                 
91 Skjølsvik et al, supra note 44 at 14.  
92 Bazari and Longva, supra note 70 at 15.  
93 IMO, supra note 42 at 34.  
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incorporated into the EEDI formula and into Regulation 21.5 of Annex VI, although reducing 
speed is generally regarded as the easiest way to improve a ship’s fuel efficiency.94  
 Third, to ensure the smooth and uniform implementation of the EEDI, Annex VI and 
the Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI 
Survey and Certification Guidelines) regulate a two-stage survey and verification process.95 
Based on regulations 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Annex VI and the Guidelines on the Method of 
Calculation of the Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI Calculation Guidelines), 
the EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines divide the process into two stages: preliminary 
verification at the design stage and final verification at sea trial.96 At the first stage, a report 
of pre-verification will be provided by the verifier to the submitter once the verification is 
complete. At the second stage, a certificate will be issued if a ship has passed the 
certification. Through this process, verifiers of the EEDI of ships ensure that ships under 
survey and certification comply with the EEDI requirements.97  
 
B. Operational Measures 
 
The SEEMP is the operational measure regulated by Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention, 
and it constitutes the other component of the energy efficiency measures besides the EEDI. 
This plan provides a flexible mechanism for shipowners and ship operators to monitor ship 
and fleet efficiency performance over time in a cost-effective manner. The main objective of 
the plan is to minimize shipping GHG emissions by means of reducing fuel consumption,98 
while the energy efficiency operational indicator (EEOI) is often utilized as a monitoring tool 
and to establish benchmarks related to the ships’ energy efficiency.99 Regulation 22 of Annex 
VI briefly regulates the SEEMP, which provides that ‘[e]ach ship shall keep on board a ship 
                                                 
94 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 21.1, 21.5.  
95 EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines, supra note 73. 
96 EEDI Calculation Guidelines, supra note 73. 
97 Verifier means ‘an Administration or organization duly authorized by it’ or, in other words, 
flag state or organizations duly authorized by it. EEDI Survey and Certification 
Guidelines, supra note 73, Article 2.1.  
98 Bazari and Longva, supra note 70, Appendix 4, 12.  
99 The energy efficiency operational indicator (EEOI) can be applied to almost all new and 
existing ships and is generally used to measure ships energy efficiency at each voyage 
or over a certain period of time. It enables ship operators to measure the fuel 
efficiency of a ship in operation and to gauge the effect of any changes in operation. 
Currently, the EEOI is circulated to encourage shipowners and ship operators to use it 
on a voluntary basis.  
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specific Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). This may form part of the 
ship’s Safety Management System (SMS).’100 
 Based on Regulations 19.1 and 22.1 of Annex VI, the SEEMP applies to all existing 
and new ships of 400 gross tonnage and above on a mandatory basis. As a ‘ship specific’ 
plan, the SEEMP adopts a four-step approach to improve a ship’s energy efficiency, namely 
planning, implementation, monitoring, and self-evaluation and improvement. The Guidelines 
for the Development of a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP Guidelines) 
introduce procedures and measures at each stage and incorporate best practices for the fuel-
efficient operation of ships.101 Moreover, similar to the EEDI Guidelines, the SEEMP 
Guidelines also highlight the importance of safe navigation.102 By introducing specific 
procedures, measures, and best practices along with the four stages of the plan, the SEEMP 
urges shipowners and ship operators at each stage to consider new technologies and practices 
when seeking to optimize the energy-efficiency performance of a ship. Additionally, the 
guidelines provide a reference for the classification societies and shipping companies to make 
their own SEEMPs. 
 To meet these SEEMP requirements, it is important for a ship to adopt specific 
operational measures for each voyage. Operational measures aiming to reduce the fuel 
consumption and carbon dioxide emissions can be classified into three categories.103 The first 
category is enhanced technical and operational management. Measures related to enhanced 
weather routing, hull and propeller cleaning, better main and auxiliary engine maintenance 
and turning, and efficient operation of larger electrical consumers are in this category. The 
second category is enhanced logistics and fleet planning. For instance, combining cargoes to 
achieve a higher utilization rate, optimization of logistic chains, larger cargo batches, 
adjustments for optimized arrival times and slower steaming, and changed contract formats 
between charter and shipowner. The third category is port-related measures. Examples 
include larger port capacity, quicker loading and discharging, flexible design of cargo 
handling equipment, more efficient port clearance and slot time allocation, and fewer 
restrictions on ship draft, beam, or length. 
                                                 
100 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 22.1.  
101 SEEMP Guidelines, supra note 73, Article 5.  
102 Ibid, Article 3.7.  
103 The information on this classification comes from the IMO Assessment Report on Energy 
Efficiency Measures for International Shipping, reprinted in Bazari and Longva, 
supra note 70, Annex, 15.  
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 A well-implemented SEEMP might lead to enhanced technical and operational 
management as illustrated earlier in the first category.104 The second and third categories, 
however, are less influenced by the SEEMP since they involve many stakeholders, which 
makes their implementation rely heavily on the co-operation of many people and groups.  
 
C. Assessment of Current Technical and Operational Measures 
 
As the first ever mandatory and legally binding energy efficiency standards,105 the EEDI and 
the SEEMP are the main technical and operational measures adopted by amendments to 
Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention in July 2011. The adoption of these measures was a 
breakthrough in the lengthy deadlock of the political negotiations on shipping GHG 
emissions within the IMO and also confirmed the leading role of the IMO in regulating the 
issue.106 According to an IMO assessment report, the combined EEDI and SEEMP will lead 
to significant emission reductions.107 This reduction, if valued in terms of annual fuel cost 
savings, will reach about US $50 billion in 2020 and get to US $200 billion by 2030.108 
Meanwhile, the cost of EEDI compliance for an ‘average ship’ will not be significant, 
although this cost will be higher in Phase 2 and 3 than in Phase 0 and 1 due to possible 
investment on design-speed reduction.109 Therefore, the overall carbon dioxide reduction 
resulting from the implementation of current technical and operational measures will be not 
only ‘positive’ but also economically sound for the shipping industry.  
 Both the EEDI and the SEEMP highlight the importance of safe navigation of ships 
while also improving the energy efficiency of shipping.110 The EEDI and SEEMP 
requirements are linked to other IMO treaties on maritime safety and security, such as the 
                                                 
104 Ibid.  
105 IMO, supra note 58.  
106 For example, Ban Kin-moon, UN secretary-general said in acknowledgment of the 
decision of the parties to Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention to adopt mandatory 
energy efficiency measures during MEPC-62, stated: ‘I would like to congratulate you 
on this significant outcome reached at IMO’s MEPC 62. This underscores the fact that 
IMO is the best positioned to play a leadership role in addressing GHG emissions 
from international shipping. This is indeed very welcome progress.’ IMO, supra note 
42 at 22, para 99.  
107 Bazari and Longva, supra note 70 at 8, executive summary.  
108 Ibid.  
109 Ibid.  
110 See, eg, MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 21.5, 22.1; 
SEEMP Guidelines, supra note 73, Article 3.7.  
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1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.111  To 
meet the safety requirements, a technological threshold is to be achieved by shipowners and 
ship operators. Additionally, both the EEDI and the SEEMP provide a strong incentive for 
the shipping industry to choose and update cost-efficient technologies to meet the criteria set 
under the EEDI and the SEEMP. The shipping industry can freely choose the technologies 
provided that they meet the requirements. This ‘freedom from prescription’ approach is vital 
for the success of this mechanism on the ground that it was strongly supported by the global 
shipping industry before it was adopted by the IMO.112 Since it is almost impossible to 
implement these IMO instruments, including the technical and operational measures, without 
compliance by the shipping industry, their active participation is essential.  
 Another example of these efforts is the negotiation on the possible approval of the 
SEEMP by flag state administrations. During the sixtieth and sixty-first MEPC meetings, 
many state delegations supported the proposal that the contents of the SEEMP should be 
examined by the administration or organization recognized by the administration as a rule,113 
while other state delegations and many industry representatives stressed that the SEEMP 
should not be approved by the administration but may be audited as a part of the ship’s safety 
management systems.114 Eventually, it was agreed that approval of the SEEMP by flag state 
administrations would not be required. This was to a significant extent achieved by many 
international shipping associations and could be deemed a victory of the shipping industry 
against the flag states. Where the SEEMP of a ship needs to be approved by its flag state, it 
will be often less efficient and more costly for the shipowners, whereas it may be beneficial 
for flag states to better manage their ships. Moreover, in view of the current ‘flag of 
                                                 
111 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, UKTS 77 
(1972). 
112 See, eg, at the fifty-seventh MEPC meeting, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) 
proposed five principles for guiding the amendment of MARPOL Annex VI, and one 
of them is that the ship operators should have the freedom to choose their compliance 
mechanism so as to protect the shipping industry form monopolistic situations. It 
treated the ‘freedom from prescription’ as the most effective means for stimulating 
future innovation. Revision of MARPOL Annex VI, submitted by the ICS, MEPC 57th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 57/4/28 (13 February 2008) at para 5.3.  
113 Generally,  the ‘Administration’ refers to a flag state and the ‘organisation recognised by 
the Administration’ refers to the classification society in that flag state.  
114 Report of the Outcomes of the Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Energy 
Efficiency Measures for Ships, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/3 
(7 July 2010) at 10, para 2.24.  
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convenience’ problem,115 to rely the examination of a ship’s SEEMP on the audit of a ship’s 
safety management system rather than on the approval of a flag state’s administration is also 
beneficial for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping.  This is because 
many open registry states often do not have enough motive and expertise to organize this 
examination of the SEEMP. 
 Despite the benefits of these technical and operational measures, some deficiencies 
remain and impose challenges for the future implementation of these measures. As far as the 
EEDI is concerned, it only applies to certain types of new ships (only covers 70 percent of 
emissions from new ships), and existing ships are not, and technically will not be, covered by 
the EEDI. This deficiency, if combined with the very lenient timetable as introduced in the 
regulation and the projected growth in international trade, would reduce to a significant 
extent the effectiveness of the EEDI. Additionally, future regulation for the remaining types 
of new ships may adopt different energy efficiency standards, which would increase the 
difficulty of effective enforcement. With respect to the MARPOL Convention, 
implementation mainly relies on flag states and port states. The IMO sets energy efficiency 
standards itself through Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention. However, the authority it 
gives to port states is limited. The added paragraph 5 of Regulation 10 of Annex VI provides 
that ‘[i]n relation to chapter 4, any port State inspection shall be limited to verifying, when 
appropriate, that there is a valid International Energy Efficiency Certificate on board, in 
accordance with article 5 of the Convention.’116 
 Through this regulation, the IMO attempts to exclude unilateral actions by port states 
in dealing with shipping GHG emissions. Nevertheless, it will be beneficial for the global 
reduction of GHG emissions from ships if some states take further steps in this regard. It is 
also believed that potential regulatory competition between different institutions will provide 
a significant motivation for the IMO to facilitate its work.117 An example of unilateral action 
is the inclusion of the emissions from the international aviation industry into the emission 
trading scheme of the EU. Although this initiative has been suspended due to opposition from 
                                                 
115 A ‘flag of convenience’ refers to ‘the flag of any country allowing the registration of 
foreign-owned and foreign-controlled vessels under conditions which for whatever 
the reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who are registering the 
vessels.’ BA Boczek, Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study, at 117 
(1962).  
116 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 10.5.  
117 Oberthür, supra note 10 at 202.  
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various developed and developing countries,118 it has motivated to some extent the efforts of 
the ICAO in accelerating its work under the Kyoto Protocol.119  
 The SEEMP is introduced as representing a reduction measure for existing and new 
ships. Basically, it is a management scheme that entails no reduction requirement at all. To a 
significant extent, the lack of reduction target setting and monitoring reduces the 
effectiveness of the SEEMP.120 This deficiency needs to be rectified by means of other 
incentives to be provided.121 It is also recommended by an IMO assessment report that EEOI  
should be encouraged or mandated as a performance indicator for the SEEMP rather than 
remain as a voluntary provision.122  
 Another challenge comes from the future enforcement of these measures by 
developing countries that opposed the adoption of the measures. Regulation 23 of Annex VI 
to the MARPOL Convention underscores the promotion of technical co-operation and 
transfer of technology, aiming to strengthen the capacity building of developing countries. 
This mechanism, if well designed, could be regarded as a kind of differentiated treatment. 
Since common responsibility and differentiated responsibility are two core elements of the 
CBDR principle, and common responsibility has been incorporated in this context via the 
NMFT principle,123 the proper design and implementation of the technical co-operation and 
transfer of technology elements of this mechanism might constitute the application of the 
CBDR principle. However, Regulation 23 lacks ‘concrete obligations’ on any state124 and 
stipulates that this technical co-operation is subject to national laws, regulations, and 
                                                 
118 The European Union (EU) has included the emissions from the international aviation 
sector into its emissions trading scheme since 1 January 2012, which charges carbon 
tax to all airlines that fly in and out of the EU. This policy suspended in December 
2012 due to strong opposition from many countries including the United States, 
Russia, China, and India. See Elena Ares, EU ETS and Aviation (23 May 2012) 
<http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05533.pdf>.  
119 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, Article 2(2).  
120 Bazari and Longva, supra note 70 at 7, executive summary.  
121 Ibid, Annex 15. The report lists some of the drivers for more effective use of the SEEMP, 
including high fuel and carbon prices, more vigorous awareness building, and cultural 
change on board ships, more collaboration between industry stakeholders and a 
solution to issue of split incentives, and effective monitoring of SEEMP 
implementation via rigorous audits and reviews.  
122 Ibid at 7.  
123 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Article 5(4).  
124 James Harrison, Recent Developments and Continuing Challenges in the Regulation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, University of Edinburgh, 
Research Paper Series, at 16 (2012), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037038> .  
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policies.125 It is expected that the transfer of technology from developed countries to 
developing countries will not be straightforward due to various domestic regulations on 
intellectual property protection in developed countries.126 In developed countries, most 
energy-efficient technologies are owned by private shipping companies. Therefore, how to 
achieve the successful transfer of technologies in a cost-effective manner remains a difficult 
question. 
 Figure 1 is one scenario devised by a recent IMO Assessment Study on Energy 
Efficiency Measures.127 The figure shows that based on the 2010 carbon dioxide emissions 
level, it is almost impossible to achieve absolute emission reduction from 2010 to 2050 using 
the EEDI and SEEMP alone. This is because new emissions produced by increased world 
trade outweigh the emissions reductions achieved by these two measures. For all scenarios, 
this conclusion is the same. Therefore, in addition to technical and operational measures 
already adopted by Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention, the international community has 
turned to MBMs to explore their utility in the possible reduction of GHG emissions from 
international shipping.  
 
 
Figure 1. Annual Emission Reduction by 2050 and New Emissions Levels (scenario A1B-4) 
                                                 
125 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 23.2.  
126 Harrison, supra note 124 at 17.  
127 Bazari and Longva, supra note 70 at 8, executive summary.  
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Source: Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for 
International Shipping, Doc MEPC 63/INF.2 (31 October 2011), Annex at 5. 
 
4. MBMs 
 
MBMs, which are also referred to as market-based instruments or market-based mechanisms, 
are generally regarded as an important supplement to the technical and operational measures 
already in place in reducing GHG emissions from international shipping. In accordance with 
the polluter pays principle, MBMs aim to provide the polluters (shipowners and ship 
operators) with an economic incentive to reduce their GHG emissions.128 As a comparatively 
new concept in the shipping context, MBMs have been controversial since they were 
formally put forward in the 2000 IMO GHG study. The IMO has endeavoured to promote the 
awareness of MBMs by relevant stakeholders of the GHG issue. As a follow up to the 2000 
GHG study commissioned by the IMO, the Scientific Study on International Shipping and 
Market-Based Instruments (Scientific Study) was published in December 2009.129 In August 
2010, another IMO-commissioned report undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility 
Study and Impact Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures (Expert Group) was 
released, the Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study 
and Impact Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures (Feasibility Study and Impact 
Assessment Report).130 Currently, a report commissioned by the IMO on possible impacts on 
consumers and industries in developing countries is under way and is expected to be finalized 
at the sixty-sixth MEPC meeting in 2014. Through this work, most countries have come to 
accept MBMs, and seven main types of proposals have been submitted to the IMO for future 
discussion, although some countries still oppose the adoption of any MBM.131 This following 
sections explore the necessity for adopting MBMs and then provide a feasibility and impact 
assessment of current MBM options.  
 
                                                 
128 Psaraftis, supra note 15 at 213.  
129 Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, MEPC 60th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 60/INF.21 (15 January 2010). 
130 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact 
Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, 
Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 August 2010). 
131 See, eg, Uncertainties and Problems in Market-based Measures, submitted by China and 
India, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/24 (5 August 2010); 
Market-based Measures: Inequitable Burden on Developing Countries, submitted by 
India, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/19 (2 August 2010).  
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A. The Necessity of MBMs in Reducing Shipping GHG Emissions 
 
In economics theory, the emergence of MBMs has been interpreted as an approach to 
overcome the problem of environmental externalities.132 MBMs are one of the main types of 
environmental policies,133 and they have been employed by many countries to regulate 
adverse environmental impacts resulting from anthropogenic activities. As defined by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
 
[MBMs] seek to address the market failure of ‘environmental externalities’ either by incorporating the 
external cost of production or consumption activities through taxes or charges on processes or 
products, or by creating property rights and facilitating the establishment of a proxy market for the use 
of environmental services.134 
 
MBMs can be classified into three groups, namely environmental fees (contribution), tradable 
permit (allowance) schemes, and liability rules.135 Nevertheless, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
MBM. In practice, different MBMs provide solutions for different problems, and some issues 
might need a mix of two or three types of MBMs.  
 In the context of GHG emissions from shipping, MBMs can be designed to internalize 
the external cost of GHG emissions from international shipping by means of a GHG fund or 
different emission trading schemes. However, the first step is to decide whether MBMs are 
needed for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. It is a difficult 
question. Many developing countries, in particular China, India, and Brazil, oppose the 
adoption of any MBMs. Their argument has mainly been underpinned by three reasons. One 
is the uncertainty associated with MBMs, including those of the carbon market, the 
calculation of the emissions from international shipping, and the effect of a carbon tax on 
ships on the export industry as well as on the future development of the shipping industry and 
                                                 
132 Environmental externalities ‘refer to the economic concept of uncompensated 
environmental effects of production and consumption that affect consumer utility and 
enterprise cost outside the market mechanism.’ OECD, Environmental Externalities 
<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=824>.  
133 Environmental policies are often classified as command and control, market-based, 
education, provision of information, and voluntary measures. Thomas Dietz and Paul 
C Stern, Exploring New Tools for Environmental Protection, in Thomas Dietz and 
Paul C Stern (eds), New Tools for Environmental Protection: Education, Information, 
and Voluntary Measures, at 4 (2002),  
134 OECD, Market-based Instruments, <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7214>.  
135 Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, MEPC 60th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 60/INF.21 (15 January 2010) at 14, Annex.  
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world trade.136 Another reason lies in the fundamental inadequacies both in theory and in 
principle. Developing countries argue that the implementation of current MBM proposals 
requires several prerequisites so as to avert the distortion of competition, such as the same or 
similar level of economic and technological development realized among all participating 
countries, some convergence of political power, and the deployment of a common central 
institution.137  
 They also assert that the NMFT principle incorporated in the majority of current 
MBM proposals ignores historical responsibility and is a disadvantage for developing 
countries.138 Moreover, some of the proposed MBMs are regarded by some developing 
countries as being likely to violate WTO rules.139 For instance, the MBM on Port State Levy 
proposed by Jamaica envisages levying a globally uniform emissions charge on all vessels 
calling at their respective ports, based on the amount of pollution produced by the vessel 
during the voyage (see Table 2). This proposal measures the amount of pollution by the 
amount of fuels consumed, which due to different ship types and operational methods may 
not be accurate. In this case, it actually leads to differentiated treatment of different ships, 
which might possibly contravene the general most-favoured-nation treatment as incorporated 
in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.140   
 In contrast to developing countries, most developed countries and NGOs are in favour 
of certain types of MBMs and have actually submitted their proposals to the IMO, although 
they disagree with each other on what type of MBM is best. The reason is simple—the 
current EEDI and SEEMP are not sufficient for effective reduction of GHG emissions from 
international shipping due to the projected growth of international seaborne trade, and, thus, 
specific types of MBMs are needed to supplement the energy-efficiency measures. 
 While intensive discussions on MBMs have been held within the IMO, it is predicted 
that a form of MBM will be adopted in the near future by the IMO or other international 
institutions to reduce emissions from ships. First, as discussed earlier, to achieve absolute 
emission reduction using EEDI and SEEMP alone is not possible in practice, which has been 
                                                 
136 Uncertainties and Problems in Market-based Measures, submitted by China and India, 
MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/24 (5 August 2010) at 2.  
137 Ibid at 3.  
138 Ibid; Market-based Measures: Inequitable Burden on Developing Countries, submitted by 
India, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/19 (2 August 2010) at 3.  
139 See, eg, Possible Incompatibility between the WTO Rules and Market-based Measures for 
International Shipping, submitted by India and Saudi Arabia, MEPC 64th Session, 
Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 64/5/3 (29 June 2012).  
140 Ibid at para 25. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 UNTS 194. 
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proven by a number of scenario modellings, revealed in many assessment reports.141 
Moreover, the EEDI and SEEMP regulations only entered into force on 1 January 2013, so in 
practice their compliance by various states and their emissions reduction potential cannot be 
identified in the short term. The shipping industry has recognized the deficiencies of these 
measures and relevant work on their improvement has been conducted within the IMO. 
However, given the intricacies of ship types and shipping features, a technical breakthrough 
is hardly likely to be achieved soon. Currently, global emissions are ‘considerably higher’ 
than the level consistent with the 2 degree Celcius target in 2020, and this trend continues.142 
Under the circumstances, it is necessary for the international shipping industry to explore and 
discuss the possibility of adopting MBMs for more GHG reduction rather than waiting for the 
effects of applying energy-efficiency measures to be practically identified.  
 Second, it is technically possible to incorporate the CBDR principle into a future 
MBM, and proposals applying the principle have been submitted to the IMO by different 
countries and NGOs.143 As shown in the comments by some developing countries, the core 
debate within the MEPC lies in the ignorance of the CBDR principle reflected in many MBM 
proposals. Once this problem is resolved, it may be possible to adopt MBMs that are accepted 
by most countries. It seems that any MBM proposal that ignores the CBDR principle would 
be hardly feasible on the ground that the CBDR principle in the shipping context has been 
supported by ‘the majority of delegations’ within the MEPC.144 In recent years, some 
international shipping organizations, as well as the shipowners’ associations in states listed in 
                                                 
141 Bazari and Longva, supra note 70 at 8, executive summary. 
142 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emissions Gap Report 2012: A 
UNEP Synthesis Report (November 2012), 
<http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf> at 1, executive summary.  
143 For example, the WWF suggested that a MBM that is both global and differentiated was 
possible to develop incorporating both the CBDR and the NMFT principles 
simultaneously, and it also put forward specific revenue allocation scheme for 
different countries. Benefits and Possible Adverse Impacts of Market-based 
Instruments, submitted by WWF, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 
58/4/39 (15 August 2008). This approach was also adopted by the Scientific Study on 
International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, a study led by the University of 
Cambridge in partnership with Cambridge Econometrics, MARINTEK, Manchester 
Metropolitan University, and Deutsches Zentrum fΰr Luft-und Raumfahrt e.V. 
Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, MEPC 60th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 60/INF.21 (15 January 2010).   
144 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc 
MEPC 58/23 (16 October 2008) at 38, para 4.45.  
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Annex I to the UNFCCC, also came to accept the incorporation of the CBDR principle into a 
proposed MBM.145  
 The possible adoption of MBMs could reduce shipping GHG emissions in two 
respects: in-sector reduction and out-of-sector reduction.146 In the first case, a MBM may 
provide an economic incentive (for example, a charge on fuel, a refund to ‘good performance 
ships’) for the shipping industry to reduce its fuel consumption. The industry might invest in 
more fuel efficient ships or technologies or operate ships in a more energy-efficient manner. 
In the second case, the money collected from a MBM could be utilized to reduce GHG 
emissions outside the marine sector. In this way, growing shipping emissions could be offset 
by emission reduction in other sectors. 
 
B. The Feasibility and Impact Assessment of MBM Options 
 
In order to adopt a MBM for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping, it 
is important to know what choices exist and whether they will have adverse impacts on the 
shipping industry and different countries, in particular, developing countries. Based on these 
analyses, the selection and adoption of a suitable MBM is possible. Currently, there are seven 
types of MBM proposals being discussed and debated within the IMO. A brief introduction 
of these proposals is illustrated in Table 2. To simplify future assessments and facilitate the 
decision-making process of the MEPC, intensive debate on the grouping of these proposals 
was held at the third GHG-WG meeting. It was concluded that MBM proposals should be 
grouped into two categories, the first one focused on in-sector reduction and the second one 
                                                 
145 See, eg, at the fifty-ninth MEPC meeting, Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 
proposed three principles on tackling GHG emissions from ships, namely the NMFT 
principle, the principle of high quality, multiple benefit carbon mitigation investment, 
and the CBDR principle. It further explained that a framework established by the IMO 
on combating climate change should respect both the NMFT principle and the CBDR 
principle. Consideration of Adoption of Three Principles for Market-based 
Instruments, submitted by CLIA, MEPC 59th Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 
59/4/32 (8 May 2009) at para 1. Another example is from Australian Shipowners 
Association (ASA). In a proposal drafted by the ASA and some of other shipowners 
association, the ASA supported a ‘cap-and-trade’ emission-trading scheme for 
shipping and recognized that the CBDR principle ‘may also need to be reflected’ in 
this scheme. ASA et al, A Global Cap-and-Trade System to Reduce Carbon 
Emissions from International Shipping, at 3 (2009), <http://www.asa.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/Joint-Industry-ETS-Discussion-PapervFINAL1.pdf>.  
146 IMO, Market-based Measures, 
<http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/
Market-Based-Measures.aspx>.  
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focused on in-sector and out-of-sector reduction, as indicated in Table 2.147 This grouping is 
based on the areas in which the reduction of GHG emissions from ships will mainly take 
place and has received many comments on their strengths and weaknesses from different 
delegations.148 This section divides these MBM options into three groups. They are 
environmental fee-related MBM proposals, tradable permit scheme-related MBM proposals, 
and hybrid MBM proposals. 
 
Table 2. Seven Types of MBM Proposals Submitted to the IMO (as of May 2013) 
MBM proposals Proponents Working mechanisms / Grouping of 
emission reduction 
Base documents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GHG Fund 
Cyprus, Denmark, 
the Marshall 
Islands, Nigeria, 
and the 
International 
Parcel Tankers 
Association 
(IPTA) 
Establishes a global reduction target for 
international shipping, set by either the 
UNFCCC or the IMO. Emissions above the 
target line would be offset largely by 
purchasing approved emission reduction 
credits. The offsetting activities would be 
financed by a contribution paid by ships on 
every tonne of bunker fuel purchased 
(Grouping: In-Sector and Out-of-Sector) 
 
 
MEPC 59/4/5, 
MEPC  
60/4/8, 
GHG-WG 3/2/1, 
GHG-WG 3/3/4 
 
 
 
 
Clean Shipping 
Coalition (CSC) 
Establishes a speed-related GHG or 
compensation fund to include regulated slow 
steaming in the design and impact assessment 
of any MBM proposals. It set average target 
speeds for different types and sizes of ships 
in order to meet the agreed emissions 
reduction target set by the IMO for an MBM. 
Additional speed levy or contribution would 
be payable for ships having higher average 
speeds. Revenues could be used to purchase 
 
 
 
 
MEPC 64/5/8, 
MEPC 64/INF.14 
                                                 
147 Report of the Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Ships, note by the Secretariat, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, 
Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011) at para 3.39. 
148 Ibid at para 3.40-3.46; see also Grouping and Evaluation of Proposed MBMs, submitted 
by Greece, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from 
Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, Doc GHG-WG 3/3 (24 February 2011); The 
Evaluation on the Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of the Reduction Mechanisms 
Employed by the MBM Proposals, submitted by the Republic of Korea, Intersessional 
Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda 
Item 3, Doc GHG-WG 3/3/1 (25 February 2011).  
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offsets. 
(Grouping: Focus on In-Sector) 
 
 
 
 
Port State Levy 
(PSL) 
 
 
 
 
Jamaica 
Levies a uniform emissions charge on all 
vessels calling at their respective ports based 
on the amount of fuel consumed by the 
respective vessel on its voyage to that port. 
The CBDR principle could be achieved 
through a self-administered fund and/or some 
international mechanism (Grouping: ‘Focus 
on In-Sector’ and ‘In-Sector & Out-of-
Sector’) 
 
 
 
MEPC 60/4/40, 
MEPC 64/5/4 
 
 
 
Efficiency 
Incentive Scheme 
(EIS) 
 
 
 
Japan and World 
Shipping Council 
(WSC) 
 
All new ships, except for those that meet pre-
set EEDI thresholds and existing ships, are 
required to make payment contributions 
based on the amount of the bunker fuel 
consumed/purchased and the degree to which 
the ship’s efficiency falls short of a specific 
standard. Funds collected go to an 
International GHG Fund for further 
allocation (Grouping: Focus on In-Sector) 
 
 
MEPC 60/4/37, 
MEPC 60/4/39, 
GHG-WG 3/3/2, 
MEPC 63/5/3, 
MEPC 64/5/2, 
MEPC 64/INF.15 
 
Ship Efficiency 
and Credit 
Trading (SECT) 
 
 
United Sates 
Subjects all ships to mandatory energy-
efficiency standards. As one means of 
complying with the standard, an efficiency 
credit trading program would be established. 
These standards would become more 
stringent over time (Grouping: Focus on In-
Sector) 
MEPC 60/4/12, 
MEPC 61/5/16, 
MEPC 61/IMF.24 
 
 
 
 
 
Global Emissions 
 
 
Norway 
(later added as co-
sponsor, Germany) 
Sets a sector-wide cap on net emissions from 
international shipping. A number of 
allowances (ship emission units) 
corresponding to the cap would be released 
into the market each year via a global 
auctioning process. The units could then be 
 
 
 
MEPC 60/4/22; 
MEPC 60/4/26; 
MEPC 60/4/41; 
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Trading System 
(ETS) for 
international 
shipping 
traded. MEPC 60/4/54; 
GHG-WG 3/3/5; 
GHG-WG 3/3/6; 
GHG-WG 3/3/8  
 
 
United Kingdom 
Differs from the Norwegian ETS proposal in 
two aspects: the method of allocating 
emissions allowances (national instead of 
global auctioning) and the approach for 
setting the emissions cap (set with a long-
term declining trajectory). 
 
France 
Sets out additional details on auction design 
under a shipping ETS. In all other aspects, 
the proposal is similar to the Norwegian ETS 
proposal. 
(Grouping: In-Sector & Out-of-Sector)  
 
 
Penalty on trade 
and development 
 
 
 
Bahamas 
The imposition of any costs should be 
proportionate to the contribution by 
international shipping to global carbon 
dioxide emissions. The reduction will apply 
to individual ships and not member states, 
and developing states will not be faced with a 
penalty upon trade and development 
(Grouping: Focus on In-Sector) 
 
 
MEPC 60/4/10, 
GHG-WG 3/2  
 
 
Rebate 
mechanism for a 
market-based 
instrument for 
international 
shipping 
 
 
 
 
IUCN (WWF 
provides add-on 
options) 
Compensate developing countries for the 
financial impact of a MBM. It could be either 
applied to any maritime MBM that generates 
revenue (add-on option) or integrated with 
the International Maritime Emission 
Reduction Scheme (integrated option) 
(Grouping: ‘Focus on In-Sector’ and ‘In-
Sector & Out-of-Sector’ (add-on); In-Sector 
and Out-of-Sector (integrated)) 
 
 
MEPC 60/4/55, 
MEPC 61/5/33; 
MEPC 64/5/10, 
MEPC 64/5/12 
Source: The information in this table comes from the following texts: IMO, Main Events in IMO’s Work on 
Limitation and Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping (2011) 
<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emissions.aspx>; Report of the 
Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Note by the 
Secretariat, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011) Annex 2. 
 
i. Environmental fee-related MBM proposals 
 
The GHG Fund, Port State Levy, and Penalty on Trade and Development are types of 
environmental fee-related MBM proposals. They provide the polluter with an incentive to 
reduce GHG emissions in order to pay less fees. Among the three proposals, the GHG Fund 
has received the most international attention. The Scientific Study on International Shipping 
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and Market-Based Instruments asserts that all emissions covered by the GHG Fund will raise 
revenue for a central governing body, and the amount depends on the carbon price per tonne 
of carbon dioxide and on the amount of emissions.149 The higher carbon price generally 
indicates more reduction of carbon dioxide emissions.150 In this case, the carbon price, or the 
‘contribution,’ is actually a levy on fuel since it has to be imposed on ships if these MBMs 
apply.151 In this way, the shipping GHG emissions could be reduced, and the revenues raised 
could be utilized to either compensate developing countries or reduce out-of-sector emissions 
through purchasing ‘offsets.’ Nevertheless, the utilization of revenues for reducing out-of-
sector GHG emissions does not indicate that in-sector emission reduction is less significant. 
Rather, it is because the in-sector reduction can be achieved through the collection of a 
contribution or levy.152 Since shipowners generally respond to prices quickly, this proposal 
seems feasible and easy to implement.153 The main concern about this proposal lies in its 
dealing with revenue and how the special conditions of developing countries are taken into 
account. There might be another concern about the increased cost, including the extra 
administrative burden, associated with the GHG Fund proposal. The Feasibility Study and 
Impact Assessment Report, undertaken by the Expert Group and commissioned by the IMO, 
provides a comprehensive assessment of proposed MBMs. This report reveals that the 
increased cost for the GHG Fund is the lowest among the current MBM proposals except for 
the Penalty on Trade and Development proposed by the Bahamas.154  
 The Port State Levy proposed by Jamaica levies a uniform emissions charge on all 
vessels calling at ports, based on the amount of fuel consumed by the vessels on their voyage 
to that port. Technically, this option can be easily implemented and is consistent with the 
polluter pays principle due to its inclusion of all emissions produced by the ship during that 
journey. However, as mentioned earlier, this option might neither be accurate nor fair for all 
ships since it measures the ship’s actual emissions solely by the fuels that have been 
consumed. This measurement ignores other pertinent parameters and, thus, is not conducted 
                                                 
149 Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-Based Instruments, IMO Doc. 
MEPC 60/INF.21 (15 January 2010) at 3.  
150 Ibid.  
151 Psaraftis, supra note 15 at 223.  
152 Ibid.  
153 Ibid at 225.  
154 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact 
Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, 
Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 August 2010) at 14–16.  
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in a ‘cost-effective’ manner.155 Meanwhile, since port states play a crucial role in the 
enforcement of this MBM, it is important to ensure that all port states, including those that 
choose not to participate in the system and those that lack proper monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, collaborate in implementing it.156 Otherwise, some ships may opt for routes 
through ports that lack monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to avoid the levy. This may 
lead to competitive distortion, distortion in trade flows, and a non-level playing field among 
shipping companies and ports. Additionally, under this scheme, the increased cost option is 
estimated to be the highest among current MBM options.157 At the sixty-fourth MEPC 
meeting, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) announced that its preferred MBM is a 
levy or compensation fund-based system and should directly relate to the actual fuel 
consumption of individual ships in service.158 This preference has also been followed by the 
shipping industries in some countries such as Greece and Korea.159  
 The penalty on trade and development proposal by the Bahamas aims to reduce 
shipping GHG emissions through the imposition of a penalty (cost) and insists that such costs 
should be proportionate to the GHG emissions from international shipping. To achieve this 
goal, it seeks to collect emission statistics from either the EEOI or ship funnels using a 
suitable sensor. According to the proposal, the ship is required to submit data to its flag state 
or recognized organization for annual verification. Under this scheme, no extra cost would be 
generated, but the main problem is that the EEOI is not available for all types of ships, and, 
                                                 
155 Grouping and Evaluation of Proposed MBMs, submitted by Greece, Intersessional 
Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda 
Item 3, Doc GHG-WG 3/3 (24 February 2011) at para 44.  
156 Psaraftis, supra note 15 at  222.  
157 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact 
Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, 
Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 August 2010) at 14.  
158 Operational Energy Efficiency of New and Existing Ships, submitted by the International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 64/5/11 
(27 July 2012) at para 11.  
159 Union of Greek Shipowners, Prevention of Environmental Pollution by Ships: Regulation 
and Compensation Regimes and Industry Standards (2011) 
<http://www.nee.gr/default.asp?t=anakoinoseisDetails&id=13> at 29; George A 
Gratsos, Green and More Profitable Shipping (13 November 2012) 
<http://www.nee.gr/downloads/183NEWSFRONT%20NAFTILIAKI%2013-11-
12.pdf>; Sang-Yoon Lee and Young-Tae Chang, ‘Shipping Companies’ Awareness 
and Preparedness for Greenhouse Gas Regulations: A Korean Case, in Theo 
Notteboom, ed, Current Issues in Shipping, Ports and Logistics, 25 at 44 (2011).  
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currently, EEOI baselines are also ‘impossible’ to establish.160 The application of this 
proposal to the GHG issue will not be feasible if this problem cannot be resolved.  
 
ii. Tradable permit scheme-related MBM proposals 
 
Among the seven types of MBM proposals, the three types of global emissions trading 
systems (ETS) for international shipping submitted by Norway, the United Kingdom, and 
France are tradable permit scheme-related MBM proposals. The ETS mechanism was first 
regulated by the Kyoto Protocol and is currently utilized in the EU. As the world’s largest 
company-level ‘cap-and-trade’ system, the EU ETS scheme has applied since 1 January 
2005. As of 14 November 2012, all twenty-seven EU member states and three other 
European countries have participated in the scheme.161 Currently, there are only minor 
differences between the three ETS proposals for international shipping. Compared to the 
Norwegian ETS, the proposal by the United Kingdom has a different method of allocating 
emissions allowances and a different approach to setting the emissions cap, while the French 
proposal provides details on auction design. The main strength in relation to these ETSs lies 
in their higher certainty of carbon dioxide reduction. Although no international ETS has been 
implemented, a regional EU ETS might provide a ‘prototype’ from which international 
shipping can learn.162  
 There are significant challenges in implementing these ETS proposals for 
international shipping. First, significant carbon leakage and distortion of competition risks 
exist under the current ETS proposals. Carbon leakage generally refers to differentiated 
carbon policies and their subsequent impacts on GHG emissions.163 Since carbon leakage 
might hinder the success of a global GHG emissions reduction and thus distort global 
competition, it is important for the ETS to be applied to the international transportation 
sector, including international aviation, rather than solely to the shipping industry or even 
part of the shipping industry.164 The Norwegian ETS provides two exemptions from applying 
the scheme, namely ships below certain sizes and ships on international voyages to small 
                                                 
160 Psaraftis, supra note 15 at 221.  
161 These three states are Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. European Commission, 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm>.  
162 Psaraftis, supra note 15 at 223.  
163 Larry Parker and John Blodgett, ‘Carbon Leakage’ and Trade: Issues and Approaches (19 
December 2008), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40100.pdf>.  
164 Moffat, supra note 15 at 121.  
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island developing states (SIDS).165 While it is a common practice within the IMO regime to 
set a threshold for ship size, the design of the voyage exemption was to meet the needs of 
developing countries. However, this regulation may also make it possible for some 
shipowners or ship operators to opt for certain ship sizes or certain shipping routes through 
the SIDS in order to get emission exemptions. In this case, competition will be distorted, and 
the reduction goal may also be hard to achieve. Second, compared with the GHG Fund 
proposal, an ETS incurs much higher administrative costs to track, monitor, and enforce as 
well as to avoid evasion and fraud. Last but not least, the current situation, in relation to the 
EU ETS generally, provides more uncertainty for the future development of an ETS for 
international shipping. As discussed earlier, the inclusion of the emissions from the 
international aviation industry into the EU ETS was suspended in December 2012, which, to 
some extent, makes the ETS less attractive for the shipping industry. Currently, international 
shipping organizations are generally against an ETS, whereas the shipping associations in 
some of the Annex I states to the UNFCCC support it.166  
 
iii. Hybrid MBM proposals 
 
Of the seven types of MBM proposals, the Efficiency Incentive Scheme, Ship Efficiency and 
Credit Trading, and Rebate Mechanism belong to the category of hybrid MBM proposals. 
The Efficiency Incentive Scheme and Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading can be regarded as 
hybrid MBMs with the EEDI as a benchmark, whereas the Rebate Mechanism is a hybrid 
MBM that can be built into any other MBM. One common feature between the Efficiency 
Incentive Scheme and Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading is that they both reward good 
performance ships in their own way, and the EEDI is used for measurement. However, it is 
the EEDI that makes the two hybrid MBM proposals less attractive. Two factors contribute to 
this argument. First, low EEDI indicates high energy efficiency, whereas a ship with a low 
                                                 
165 A Further Outline of A Global Emission Trading System (ETS) for International Shipping, 
submitted by Norway, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 60/4/22 (15 
January 2010) at 12, Annex 2.  
166 See, eg, the Round Table of International Shipping Associations, which opposed any 
emission trading system (ETS) in that it would be ‘unworkable’ for the shipping 
industry. Round Table of International Shipping Associations, supra note 47. The 
national shipowners associations in Australia, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom released a discussion paper in 2009 supporting a global cap-and-
trade ETS to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping. ASA et al, supra 
note 145.  
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EEDI does not necessarily mean that it has the lowest GHG emissions.167 Its emissions might 
be more than those from a ship with a larger engine (high EEDI), which it needs to maintain 
certain speed to ensure safety in bad weather.168 In this case, the EEDI measurement does not 
work well. Second, the two hybrid MBM proposals, if adopted, will apply to both new ships 
and existing ships, whereas the EEDI adopted by Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention 
applies to new ships only.169 To date, there has been no research indicating the possible 
application of the EEDI to existing ships. After testing and verification, the International 
Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners asserts that the EEDI ‘does not apply to, and hence it 
cannot and should not be used for, existing ships.’170 Therefore, the adoption of these hybrid 
MBM proposals is not straightforward.  
 The Rebate Mechanism consists of two options: an add-on option by integrating with 
any revenue-raising MBM and an integrated option incorporated with the International 
Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme, which is a levy-on-fuel scheme. The main feature of 
this hybrid MBM is its compatibility with the CBDR principle. Under the add-on option, all 
ships pay for their emissions. However, a developing country obtains an annual rebate based 
on its share of global seaborne imports first, and then the remaining revenue from developed 
countries will be disbursed through the UNFCCC. In this way, the ‘no net incidence’ on 
developing countries can be ensured.171 In other words, developing countries will not suffer 
any loss, but they will benefit from participating in the Rebate Mechanism. The first draft of 
the legal text for the Rebate Mechanism was submitted to the sixty-fourth MEPC meeting by 
the World Wide Fund for Nature in October 2012, and it stipulates that ‘each Party not 
included in annex II of the UNFCCC, or any successor annex, shall be eligible to an 
apportioned rebate [from a potential MBM Convention],’ and this rebate could be foregone as 
its contribution to international co-operation.172 This proposed regulation expands the scope 
of the beneficiaries of this scheme from SIDS and least developed countries as proposed by 
                                                 
167 Psaraftis, supra note 15 at 222.  
168 Ibid.  
169 MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI (2011), Regulation 20–21.  
170 Application of the EEDI to Existing Ships, submitted by the International Association of 
Dry Cargo Shipowners, MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 63/5/12 (6 
January 2012), summary.  
171 Ensuring No Net Incidence on Developing Countries from A Global Maritime Market-
Based Mechanism, submitted by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), MEPC 63rd 
Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 63/5/6 (22 December 2011).  
172 Draft Legal Text on Uses of Financing Generated from A Maritime MBM, submitted by 
the WWF, MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 64/5/10 (27 July 2012) at 
5, Annex, Article 4.  
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some countries to all non-Annex II states to the UNFCCC. It is expected that this mechanism 
will be attractive for developing countries due to its incorporation of the CBDR principle. 
Compared with other proposals, this proposal better reflects the interests of both developing 
countries and developed countries. Nevertheless, if the add-on option is built into any other 
MBM proposal, such as a GHG Fund or ETS, the administrative costs will probably be 
higher due to the possible increased number of administrative bodies. Therefore, it will be 
very challenging to control these costs. Furthermore, in terms of calculating a developing 
country’s share of global imports by value, whether the available data are accurate and 
reliable, is another concern.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
It has been a challenge for the international community to provide globally uniform 
regulations for reducing GHG emissions from international shipping that are acceptable to 
both developing countries and developed countries. Since the IMO has been mandated to 
regulate GHG emissions from international shipping, the challenge becomes whether both the 
CBDR and the NMFT principles can and should be applied to the issue under discussion. 
From an international law perspective, the IMO Convention and UNCLOS provide the IMO 
with general competence to regulate the GHG issue, while the Kyoto Protocol provides the 
IMO with a specific mandate to regulate this matter. These competences make it possible for 
the IMO to apply both principles in addressing GHG emissions from ships.  
 Recently, after a long-term deadlock, the IMO has partially regulated the GHG 
emissions by adopting mandatory technical and operational measures in its amendment of 
Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention. This regulation ensures significant emissions 
reduction and provides a strong incentive for the shipping industry to update cost-efficient 
technologies. However, the limited EEDI coverage and the lack of a SEEMP reduction target 
need to be addressed. In particular, the lack of full incorporation of the CBDR principle 
makes the future enforcement of this regulation questionable particularly for developing 
country fleets. 
 In furtherance of reducing GHG emissions from ships, the IMO has organized various 
discussions and negotiations on potential MBMs. Of the current seven types of MBMs 
proposed to the IMO, each of them has its pros and cons. Generally, the GHG Fund has low 
administrative costs and has been welcomed by most of the shipping industry, whereas the 
Rebate Mechanism serves as the only MBM that properly incorporates the CBDR principle. 
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As a widely discussed option, an ETS has been opposed by the global shipping industry, but 
it has been supported by the shipping industry in some of the UNFCCC Annex I states. 
However, as all of these proposals are still under further development, it is important to 
ensure that the MBMs to be adopted should be cost-effective and take the interests of 
developing countries into account.  
 
 
